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ABSTRACT
Mullins, Tristen, H., Ph.D., University of South Alabama, May 2022. Circuit-Variant
Moving Target Defense for Side-Channel Attacks on Reconfigurable Hardware. Chair of
Committee: Todd R. Andel, Ph.D.
With the emergence of side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, bits of a secret key
may be derived by correlating key values with physical properties of cryptographic
process execution. Power and Electromagnetic (EM) analysis attacks are based on the
principle that current flow within a cryptographic device is key-dependent and therefore,
the resulting power consumption and EM emanations during encryption and/or
decryption can be correlated to secret key values. These side-channel attacks require
several measurements of the target process in order to amplify the signal of interest, filter
out noise, and derive the secret key through statistical analysis methods. Differential
power and EM analysis attacks rely on correlating actual side-channel measurements to
hypothetical models.
This research proposes increasing resistance to differential power and EM
analysis attacks through structural and spatial randomization of an implementation. By
introducing randomly located circuit variants of encryption components, the proposed
moving target defense aims to disrupt side-channel collection and correlation needed to
successfully implement an attack.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Several factors are considered when deciding on which platform to implement a
cryptographic algorithm. There are many trade-offs between software and hardware
implementations including cost, speed, and flexibility. While software implementations
are often more flexible, easier to update, and have low development costs, they can have
greater overhead costs and weaker security than their hardware counterparts.
Reconfigurable hardware devices (e.g., field-programmable gate arrays, or FPGAs)
feature characteristics that allow them comparable flexibility to software implementations
while incorporating the benefits of hardware realization. Wollinger and Paar [1] list some
potential advantages reconfigurable hardware provides for cryptography including
algorithm agility, algorithm upload, architecture efficiency, resource efficiency,
algorithm modification, throughput, and cost efficiency. Not only do these improve
algorithm performance, but they also ensure that the platform resources are used
efficiently, and updates are easily made through reconfiguration. However, these
advantages can only be exploited if security shortcomings are addressed.
The security of cryptosystems involves preventing an attacker's ability to obtain
information about plaintext. Traditionally, this has been done by prioritizing secrecy of
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the key through complex key selection and secure key exchange [2]. With the emergence
of side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, bits of a secret key may be derived by correlating
key values with physical properties of cryptographic process execution. Information such
as timing [3], power [4], and electromagnetic (EM) radiation [5] side-channel properties
can all be observed during run-time of a cryptoprocess. These signals reflect datadepended system behaviors that may be analyzed by an attacker to derive secret key
values.
The ability to obtain information about the system is dependent on the
accessibility of a “usable” side-channel and does not “reflect inherent weaknesses” of the
process being examined [6]. Therefore, countermeasures for SCA attacks should focus on
reducing trace usability by minimizing behavior-key correlation and information leakage
within the signal.

1.2 Problem Statement
Side-channel countermeasures are designed to increase the complexity of SCA
attacks. This is often done through hiding and masking techniques such as random delay
insertion (RDI) [7]–[9], shuffling [10]–[13], masking [14], [15], dual-rail logic [16]–[19],
etc. While increasing attack complexity makes it more difficult for an attacker to
successfully obtain the key, it does not make it impossible. Because there is currently no
solution that eliminates all side-channel leakage, we must “accept that cryptographic
implementations leak a certain amount of information,” and avoid allowing the leakages
to completely compromise security during use [20].
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Many researchers suggest implementing countermeasures in combination to
further improve security [12], [21]. Such integration has been used to address the
shortcomings of individual countermeasures. For example, masking schemes are often
applied in combination with shuffling countermeasures to increase the number of
required attack traces [12], [13].
Attackers may also have the ability to perform multiple types of SCA on devices.
With physical access to a device, both power and electromagnetic analysis (EMA) attacks
may be conducted with simple equipment. Though many power countermeasures are
assumed to protect against EMA, it has been shown that power countermeasures may still
be vulnerable to localized EMA attacks [22]–[24]. This creates a need for both power and
EMA attack prevention methods on a device. To provide sufficient security, designs
should include countermeasure combinations that not only protect against single sidechannel attacks but alternatives that may be available to an attacker with physical device
access.
However, selecting which countermeasures to apply should not be done
arbitrarily. Not only is it costly to implement multiple security measures, but some
combinations may also add deficiencies to a system. It has been shown that methods used
to secure an encryption algorithm against one kind of attack may consequently leave it
vulnerable to another [25], [26]. Therefore, it is important to assess the compatibility of
countermeasures so that attack vectors are not introduced or aided by their integration.
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1.3 Research Objective
This research focuses on increasing the complexity of localized EM SCA by
introducing structural and spatial randomization of the target hardware. This is done by
utilizing randomly placed S-box circuit variants in the programmable logic side of an
SOC. A practical countermeasure evaluation is performed by collecting power and
localized EM traces, determining which trace sets are usable, and performing first order
differential analysis on those traces.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a
background on power and EM side-channel analysis as well as countermeasures. This
includes literary review of works involving moving target defense, circuit variants, and
dynamic partial reconfiguration. Chapter III describes the goals and objectives of this
research while Chapter IV details a proposed methodology for developing and
assessing the circuit-variant moving target defense countermeasure.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

In this chapter, a background on power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis is
provided. This includes an overview of techniques for attacks as well as resistance. A
description of the algorithm used in this research, AES, is also provided. Further,
methods for quantifying countermeasure effectiveness are also discussed as well as the
applicability of power countermeasures as an EM analysis defense. Related works
involving circuit variance, moving target defenses, and dynamic partial reconfiguration
are discussed.

2.1 The AES Algorithm
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current standard for encrypting
electronic data [27]. This symmetric block cipher is a form of the Rijndael cipher [28]
that processes 128-bit blocks with variable key length. Each data block consists of 16
bytes arranged in four rows and four columns. The cipher supports key lengths of 128,
192, and 256 bits which correspond to 10, 12, and 14 rounds, respectively.
Figure 1 shows a block diagram for AES encryption. After the initial round key
addition, a round function is implemented either 10, 12, or 14 times depending on the key
length. Each round consists of four transformations: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns,
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and AddRoundKey. The only exception is the final round which does not perform the
MixColumns operation.

Figure 1. AES Encryption Block Diagram [29].

2.1.1 SubBytes
The SubBytes transformation is a non-linear byte substitution that operates on
each byte independently using a substitution table, or S-box. The S-box is constructed by
taking the multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF(28) and then applying an affine
transformation over GF(2) [27]. An example of a S-box in hexadecimal form is shown in
Table 1. An input byte xy results in an output byte that is determined by the value at the
intersection of row x and column y. For example, an input byte xy = {b1} would yield the
output byte {c8}.
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Table 1. S-box Substitution Values for The Hexadecimal Byte xy [27].

2.1.2 ShiftRows
In the Shift Rows transformation, bytes in the last three rows of the block are
cyclically shifted [27]. The bytes in each row are rotated to the left a certain number of
times depending on which row they are in. The first row does not shift, the second shift
by one, the third by two, and the fourth by three.
2.1.3 MixColumns
The MixColumns transformation operates on each column individually. Each
column is treated as a four-term polynomial over GF(28) and is multiplied with a fixed
polynomial [27]. The MixColumns transformation is not performed in the final round of
AES.
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2.1.4 AddRoundKey
For the AddRoundKey transformation, a simple bitwise XOR operation is used to
add a round key to the data [27]. The round keys are derived from the cipher key using a
key schedule that consists of the key expansion and round key selection [28]. The number
of round key bits is equal to the block length, Nb, multiplied by the number of rounds plus
one. For example, a 128-bit block length and 10-round implementation would require a
round key of 1048 bits. The cipher key is used to generate an expanded key. The first Nb
words of the expanded key are used for the first round key, the second Nb words for the
second round key, etc.
The pseudo code for the AES algorithm is shown in Figure 2. Nr represents the
number of rounds. For 128-bit AES, Nr = 10. The data block size in words is represented
by Nb. Array w[] contains the key schedule. As shown in Figure 2, all Nr rounds of the
cipher are identical with the exception of the final round. The final round is executed
outside of the for loop and does not include the MixColumns transformation.
2.1.5 Side-Channel Leakage
Of the four transformations in the round function, the SubBytes and
AddRoundKey operations are the most prone to side-channel leakage. Any operations
with output directly related to the secret key are of particular interest to attackers.
SubBytes applies a function to each byte of the state. Therefore, each output byte of the
SubBytes transformation in the first round can be calculated based on one byte of
plaintext and one byte of the key [30]. While simple countermeasures may be used to
mask the side-channel leakage of the AddRoundKey function, the non-linearity of the
SubBytes transformation makes it difficult to mask [31]. Further, masked S-box
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implementations may still leak information via glitches when realized in hardware,
requiring the inclusion of additional countermeasures [32].

Figure 2. Pseudo Code for AES Algorithm [33].

2.2 Power Analysis
Kocher et al. first introduced power analysis attacks in 1998 [34]. Their work
demonstrated that secret keys may be revealed through power consumption
measurements of devices. This method of secret key derivation is based on the behavior
of semiconductor logic. When charge is applied to or removed from transistors, a current
is induced that consumes power and emits EM radiation [34]. This switching activity may
vary depending on which operations are being performed on a device as well as the data
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being processed. For example, operations that are performed using different circuits
would have differing power consumption behavior. Similarly, varying numbers of
transistors may experience switching activity depending on the input values being used
[35]. These trends in power consumption may be measured by an attacker and used to
determine runtime information that may otherwise be assumed to be private. If the
device under observation is executing cryptographic processes, the data-dependent power
usage may expose the secret key.
For power analysis attacks, one or more traces must be collected. A trace consists
of measurements taken during the execution of the crypto-process being targeted.
Mangard et al. [30] presents a block diagram of a typical measurement setup that includes
the sequence of interactions for acquiring a power or EM trace. Figure 3 shows this block
diagram. In the first step, the cryptographic device is supplied with power and a clock
signal. The power measurement circuit or EM probe is also placed during this step while
the oscilloscope is initialized in the second. During step 3, commands are sent to the
device to start execution. Power consumption is measured at step 4 using the
measurement device (i.e., circuit or probe) and oscilloscope set up previously. Power
measurement circuits often consist of a small resistor in series with the power supply or
ground of the device. The oscilloscope samples the voltage drop across the resistor which
is proportional to the power consumption under a constant power supply. EM probes
serve as contactless alternatives to power measurement circuits. Using these devices, an
oscilloscope measures the output voltage of the probe which is proportional to the
device’s EM field-inducing power consumption. The PC receives the output of the
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cryptographic process in step 5 and the power trace from the oscilloscope in step 6. To
collect multiple traces, steps 2 through 6 are repeated as necessary.

Figure 3. Block Diagram of a Typical Measurement Setup for Power Analysis [30].

Figure 4 shows an example power trace for AES-128 encryption on a smart card
collected by Kocher et al. [35]. The 10 rounds of AES are clearly visible within the trace,
a characteristic that can aid an attacker in identifying which encryption algorithm their
target is using.

Figure 4. Power Trace from AES-128 on a Smart Card by Kocher et al. [35].
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Simple implementations that yield low-noise measurements may be broken with a
single trace in a Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack. The more complex the device,
however, the noisier the signal may be. Electronic noise from the power supply and clock
generator or switching noise from other components and parallel operations may decrease
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). A low SNR can be overcome by taking more traces as
well as utilizing signal processing methods. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) may be
applied in scenarios where SPA falls short. DPA attacks utilize statistical functions that
are designed for specific cryptographic algorithms [36].
2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis
With simple power analysis attacks [34], the attacker attempts to infer information
about a process directly by visually analyzing a single power trace or very few traces. I/O
operations and individual rounds have been identified using SPA profiling [35], [37].
Biham and Shamir introduced a profiling method to identify key scheduling [37]. Using
their method, data-dependent portions of the trace are found by comparing power traces
that process different input data. Key-dependent portions are identified using the traces
from multiple devices which each have a unique key. Several models link power
consumption to the hamming weight of the processed data or the hamming distance
between that data and [38]–[41]. This information leakage that is observable using SPA,
can significantly reduce the number of candidates when trying to brute-force search the
key [42]. When no countermeasures are implemented, data-dependent instruction
sequences may reveal power consumption differences for “0” and “1” key bits. Kocher et
al. demonstrates this using a simple implementation of RSA, shown in
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Figure 5 [35]. This trace was gathered during the modular exponentiation step of
RSA in which squares and multiplies are performed using bits from the decryption key.
Per the structure of the algorithm, squares are consumed in each iteration of the loop
while multiplications are only performed when the bit of the exponent is equal to 1. This
behavior can be directly observed in the power consumption of the unprotected device
since the multiplication operation consumes more power than the square, allowing the
bits of the decryption key to be identified. In order to find the key, the attacker must have
detailed knowledge of the algorithm used by the target. Nevertheless, by revealing data
and operation dependent power consumption with minimal traces, SPA techniques may
still be leveraged by attackers to aid in more complex SCA attacks against protected
implementations.

Figure 5. SPA Leaks in RSA Modular Exponentiation by Kocher et al. [35].

2.2.2 Differential Power Analysis
Differential power analysis [34] uses algorithm-specific statistical methods to
identify data-dependent correlations in power traces. These attacks differ from SPA
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attacks in several ways. Where SPA analyses a single trace over time, DPA requires a
large number of traces and is able to find small correlations at specific points [30]. The
attacker often does not need to be knowledgeable of details beyond which algorithm is
used by the target to perform a DPA attack as opposed to SPA.
DPA attacks all follow a general procedure. Mangard et al. [30] describe the DPA
strategy in 5 steps which are displayed in Figure 6.
2.2.2.1 Step 1: Select Intermediate Value.

In the first step, the attacker must choose

an intermediate result on which to base the attack. This result must be a key-dependent
value (e.g., an XOR operation or S-box output for AES) and may be represented as a
function of d and k where d corresponds to plaintext or ciphertext and k is the key.
2.2.2.2 Step 2: Collect Traces.

Power consumption measurements are taken in step 2.

The attacker must know each data value d that is processed, represented as vector d = (d1,
…, dD)'. For each of the D data blocks, a power trace t is taken at each encryption or
decryption, i. The power trace for di is t’i = (ti,1, …, ti,T), where T is the length of the
trace. The resulting power traces for step 2 are shown in Figure 6 as a matrix of size D ´
T and all use the same secret key.
2.2.2.3 Step 3: Calculate Hypothetical Intermediate Values.

The vector k = (k1, …,

kK) is comprised of all K key hypotheses. Each of these elements are used in the
calculation of hypothetical intermediate values f(d, k) in step 3. The results are found in
matrix V of size D ´ K where vi,j represents the intermediate value corresponding to di
and kj. Because k includes all possible values for the key, one column in V corresponds
to the intermediate value that was calculated using the correct key.
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Figure 6. Five Steps of DPA Attack based on Mangard et al. [30].

2.2.2.4 Step 4: Map Hypothetical Power Consumption.

Hypothetical power

consumption, matrix H in Figure 6, is then obtained for each intermediate value v in step
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4. This is done using simulation techniques that are based on the attacker’s understanding
of the target device’s behavior. Hamming-distance and Hamming-weight models are the
most common power models used in DPA attacks due to their ease of application [30].
Customized power models increase the effectiveness of the attack but are up to the
attacker to derive using their knowledge of the device.
Before performing the final step of a DPA attack, the attacker needs to make sure
each column tj consists of similar operations before calculating the correlation
coefficients for matrix R. This can be done using a trigger signal to indicate the
beginning of a specific operation and initiate measurement with the oscilloscope. In a
controlled setting, the attacker would be able to program the device to trigger the
oscilloscope consistently before a process. However, an attacker may not have sufficient
control over the device for this method. If no other useful signals can be measured from
the device, alternatives may be used such as the start signal from the PC to cryptographic
device shown in step 3 of Figure 3. Using such asynchronous signals may result in
inconsistent delays between the trigger and start of encryption. Attackers must utilize
alignment methods when preprocessing their traces to remove these delays and ensure
that the power consumption within each column tj is dependent on the same operations.
2.2.2.5 Step 5: Comparison of Power Consumption.

Finally, in step 5, the

hypothetical and actual power consumption for each key hypothesis is compared. That is,
the columns of matrix H are compared to the column of matrix T to obtain a matrix of
size K ´ T, R. Each element ri,j corresponds to the correlation coefficient of columns hi
and tj and range in value from -1 to 1. An explanation of the correlation coefficient
algorithm can be found in [30]. The attacker assumes that there exists a column hck that
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corresponds to the hypothetical power consumption calculated using the correct key. It is
also assumed that there exists a column tct that contains power consumption values that
depend on the intermediate values selected in step 1. These two columns yield the highest
value in matrix R, rck,ct. The location of this element in R reveals the correct key
hypothesis as well the position of the power trace at which intermediate values are
processed. If there is no clear maximum value rck,ct, more traces may need to be taken to
determine the relationship between the columns of H and T.

2.3 Electromagnetic Analysis
While data-dependent current flow serves as the basis for power analysis attacks,
it also emits electromagnetic fields that can contain key-revealing information. Simple
and Differential Electromagnetic Analysis attacks (SEMA and DEMA, respectively)
follow similar statistical analysis methods to SPA and DPA using signals collected from
EM field probes [35], [36], [43]. Using EM rather than current-based power
measurements for attacks does have its advantages. EM measurements offer a desirable
alternative to power consumption when access to the power and ground lines are limited,
when the power signal contains too much noise, or when power analysis countermeasures
are implemented [43]–[46].
The majority of difference between EMA and power analysis methods are a result
of the respective signals’ frequency contents. Debeer et al. [45] identify four points of
variation: aliasing, alignment, resampling, and probe positioning. Unlike power signals,
EM signals maintain their strength at high frequencies. Because of this, samples taken at
too low a frequency could misrepresent the original signal, a concept referred to as
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aliasing. This may be prevented by excluding high frequencies during trace collection
using a low-pass filter between the probe and oscilloscope. Debeer et al. [45] also
describe how common techniques for alignment and resampling of power traces are not
applicable to unprocessed EM traces due to their lack of low-frequency components, but
can be used after some simple preprocessing methods.
When using a high-resolution EM probe, attackers may perform localized attacks
using traces collected from a specific area on the chip [44]. These types of attacks are
most successful when the probe is placed above the area of the chip where the sidechannel leakage of interest is strongest [47]. To determine the optimal probe position,
measurements are taken across the surface of the chip during the execution of the target
process. If the chip hosts a variety of processes with distinct clock frequencies, the EM
signal should be filtered to reduce components that are not related to the target
operations. Figure 7 shows how the location of the strongest signal is dependent on the
clock frequency observed. This XY scan of a smart card by Debeer et al. [45] displays
EM signal strengths that indicate the location of the main processor and the cryptoprocessor which run at the external and internal clock frequency, respectively. The
location with the strongest signal at the target process’s clock frequency indicates the
optimal probe position for trace collection. If there are multiple locations that meet this
criteria, the position with EM signal behavior that can be related to the target process
should be selected [45]. Other works have also identified leakage “hotspots” by
performing EM attacks at multiple locations on a chip and plotting the correlation values
in a heat map [48], [49].
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Figure 7. EM XY Scan at External (Left) and Internal Clock Frequency (Right) [45].

After traces are collected and processed, the statistical analysis for EMA attacks is
similar to those of SPA and DPA. In their 2001 work, Quisquater and Samyde [43]
attribute this to EM signals containing “at least the same information” as power
signals. Agrawal et al. [22] and Gandolfi et al. [44] found that EM emanations contain
multiple information leakages that can be used in attacks where SPA/DPA may fall short.
Other works comparing leakage models have also found EM signals to contain more
information than current-based power signals [50], [51].

2.4 Countermeasures
Side-channel countermeasures aim to minimize information leakage as much as
possible. Because leakage cannot be entirely eliminated [20], designers need a method of
quantifying how effective their countermeasures are against attacks.
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2.4.1 Evaluating Countermeasures
Evaluation is an important part of conveying the impacts of countermeasure
designs. This is often done using one of two approaches: proving a countermeasure in
theory or in practice [52].
Many countermeasures have been shown to be theoretically secure through
mathematical proofs [13], [53]–[57].While leakage may be sufficiently minimized under
the assumptions of the proof, the design may still be vulnerable to attacks when realized
on a physical device. The models used for these theoretical security evaluations require
assumptions that are not able to consider all possible leakage sources. For example,
several mathematically secure masking schemes have been found to leak information via
logic gate switching activity or hardware glitches [58]–[60]. In their 2012 work [52],
Moradi and Mischke further evaluate Prouff and Roche’s glitch-free masking scheme
[57]. They found that though the scheme was secure under the assumptions of the
original article, more realistic analysis revealed exploitable leakages that were out of the
scope of the original model. The authors suggest that proposals supported by theoretical
security proofs may leverage the real-world perspective of practical analysis to obtain a
more thorough security evaluation. Using practical evaluation methods to support the
claims of theoretical security proofs has since become more common in the literature
[61]–[64].
Practical countermeasure evaluation is done using real side-channel measurement
traces. Many researchers quantify the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures using
the number of traces needed to break the encryption. This metric provides insight on how
much resistance a countermeasure provides against a specific attack. Number of attack
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traces may be used to evaluate how a countermeasure compares to an unprotected
implementation in a controlled setting. This method may also be used to evaluate
incremental changes to schemes such as introducing additional countermeasures for a
combined security approach [12], [65], [66]. There are limitations to comparing proposed
countermeasures from distinct works using this metric since number of required traces is
dependent on several variables including target device, equipment used for trace
collection, and analysis methods. Because differential SCA attacks rely on a devicedependent power model, the number of required traces is not necessarily guaranteed for
all implementations. It is important that this metric only be used to compare
countermeasures that have been implemented on similar devices. Furthermore, a
countermeasure that guarantees security within a given number of traces against one
attack does not necessarily guarantee the same level of security against other side-channel
attack methods [12], [67]. Therefore, it is important for a researcher to make clear the
scenarios in which the countermeasure may achieve the presented level of security.
The cost of implementing a countermeasure is another aspect that should be
considered by designers. When a user is selecting among effective and usable
countermeasures, the security-cost trade-off may be the deciding factor. Many
researchers describe countermeasure costs in terms of number of specific logic elements.
However, hardware requirements for a given implementation may vary among devices.
In [68], Katashita et al. show that the lookup table specifications for two FPGAs result in
large resource utilization differences for the same circuit. Similar to the security metrics
discussed earlier, resource utilization may be used to describe costs relative to an
unprotected implementation but have limitations due to their device-dependency. Other
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cost metrics used to evaluate countermeasures include performance and storage overhead
[49], [66], [69].
2.4.2 Countermeasure Techniques
Side-channel analysis countermeasures focus on minimizing the correlation
between key-dependent operations and the data that is leaked. Techniques traditionally
fall into one of two categories: hiding and masking. In this section, both categories are
discussed as well as methods specific to EMA prevention.
Hiding countermeasures involve decreasing the signal-to-noise ratio for a sidechannel. This is often done through leveling techniques which decrease the signal or
randomization techniques that increase noise level [70]. Many leveling techniques have
been developed to minimize key-dependent fluctuations in power consumption and
execution timing. Some examples include using low-drop-out voltage regulators to
maintain a constant voltage across encryption blocks [71], dual-rail pre-charge logic to
control the number of observed transitions on a power side-channel [72], and constanttime operation to thwart timing attacks [73], [74]. Some randomization techniques
include shuffling operations [75], insertion of dummy rounds [76], and random delay
insertion [77] to introduce noise to hinder power and timing attacks. Some reconfigurable
hardware has the advantage of being able to implement countermeasures that leverage
dynamic reconfiguration capabilities. This feature of the device can be used to introduce
randomness in timing, target location [66], and hardware structure [78]. Though all of
these countermeasures increase resistance to side-channel attacks, they would need to be
implemented in combination with other countermeasures to sufficiently reduce the risk of
leaking key-revealing information [12], [65], [76], [79].

22

One of the most common countermeasures for side-channel attacks is masking.
This method involves randomizing intermediate values so that there are no dependencies
between side-channel info and the actual secret key. This countermeasure is implemented
at the algorithm level and includes methods such as Boolean [56], [78], [80],
multiplicative [81], [82], and combinations of the variants [83], [84]. Like hiding
schemes, masking countermeasures are also often implemented in combination with other
countermeasures to reduce side-channel related risks [10], [12], [85]. When masking
schemes are realized in hardware, logic gate switching activity (i.e., glitches) can leak
information that could be leveraged by a side-channel attack [58]–[60]. To overcome this
risk, masking schemes for hardware should be designed to either work in the presence of
glitches [86] or avoid them altogether [18], [87].
Many researchers consider EM analysis a variant of power analysis, grouping
methods and countermeasures for both [35], [88]. The similarities between the sidechannel types allow for their countermeasures to be inclusive against standard attacks.
However, it has been shown that implementations with DPA countermeasures may be
vulnerable to more advanced localized EM attacks [23], [24]. In [23], Specht et al. use
localized EMA to isolate the leakage from separate shares in a threshold implementation
countermeasure. Their attack combines leakage from multiple probes to break the
scheme. Another example is dual-rail logic which has been shown to prevent power
attacks becomes vulnerable to localized EM attacks due to placement and routing
imbalances [24]. The shortcoming of power countermeasures against localized EMA
attacks highlights the need for an additional family of countermeasures.
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Existing countermeasures against EMA fall into two categories similar to masking
and hiding: signal information reduction and signal strength reduction [22]. Signal
information reduction involves randomization and refreshing techniques that are also
used for power SCA defense (e.g., additional noise, masking). Signal strength reduction
includes techniques that are unique to EMA prevention such as spatial randomization and
shielding.
In [66], Mentens et al. introduce “spatial jitter” which randomizes the location of
functional blocks dynamically to prevent EMA. Li et al. [48] propose a spatial
randomization of dataflow in which data bytes are randomly assigned to AES S-boxes
that are places throughout the FPGA fabric. By randomizing the location at which the
target logic block is placed, EM leakage hotspots are reduced and the optimal probe
location for the attack is difficult to determine.
While traditional SCA countermeasures aim to reduce the usability of a captured
signal, shielding techniques work to prevent signal capture altogether. In [89], Das et al.
propose a Signature aTtenuation Embedded CRYPTO with Low-Level metAl Routing
(STELLAR). Their technique prevents leakage through EM radiation by routing the
design to low-layer metals as well as including signature attenuation hardware to hide the
signal. Shielding designs have been proposed that also include an anti-tampering
mechanism [90], [91]. The shield utilizes substrate layers that allow for the conduction of
an integrity related signal that is broken when the shield is removed. This method was
initially proposed as a method to prevent fault injection attacks but could also be used to
prevent an attacker from removing shields intended to block EM radiation if incorporated
by vendors as suggested in [92]. Miura et al. [93] propose an EM attack sensor which
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detects when a near-field EM probe approaches the chip. This concept is based on
previous work which demonstrates that a probe cannot measure the original EM field
without disturbing it [94]. Though shielding concepts are effective at limiting EM attacks,
they incur high packaging costs. The inclusion of detection mechanisms is also
accompanied by additional overhead.

2.5 Circuit Variants
Circuit variants refer to designs that are structurally different but have similar
functionality. These designs may be diverse in logic gate types, size, and include
redundancies all of which result in variations in path delays and consequentially, sidechannel behavior.
The goal of delay-based countermeasures is to reduce the ability to align traces
collected by an attacker [95]. Randomizing the timing behavior of an implementation
results in a desynchronization effect that introduces noise within the trace set [7]. The
ability to align the portion of the traces being targeted is a crucial step in successfully
performing a differential analysis attack. If a trace is unable to be aligned with a selected
reference trace within the set, it is discarded. If a large portion of the traces within the set
are discarded, the attack cannot be reliably performed. Delay-based countermeasures
have been implemented in both software and hardware schemes through random delay
insertion, random process interrupts, and temporal jitter [7]–[9], [21], [96].
Delay characterizations may also be observed and exploited at the circuit level of
designs. In combinational logic, propagation delay refers to the maximum time it takes
for an output to reach its final value after an input switch and is the sum of the delays
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trough each element on the critical path [97]. The delay characteristics of logic gates can
vary from nanoseconds to the picosecond range depending on the technology being used
[98]. Therefore, the timing behavior of a circuit may be directly influenced by the types
of gates used to construct it as well as the number of gates. Existing works have shown
that variations in gate compositions are translated to the timing behavior of a circuit
which may be leveraged in side-channel countermeasures [88].

2.5.1 Circuit Variant Countermeasures
In 2003, Benini et al. introduce the concept of mutating a data path using powermasked modules [99]. These scheme combines a fully functional unit A and a smaller
block B that implements the most typical behavior of A but consumes less power. By
activating block B rather than block A when inputs allow, the same functionality can be
obtained with a randomized power profile. This concept was later extended to
reconfigurable hardware by Stöttinger et al. to protect AES [100]. Their approach
shuffles modules to tamper with correlation between real and estimated power
consumption levels, thwarting DPA attacks.
In [88], Bow et al. utilize two methods of circuit variance for their
countermeasure: synthesis-directed and circuit-directed. The synthesis-directed technique
involves generating netlists for S-boxes based on a behavioral description and a standard
cell library. For each netlist, the available logic gates for the standard cell libraries were
changed, forcing the synthesis tool to utilize different logic gates for the implementation.
In the circuit-directed technique, a clock delay circuit is used to add random delays along
paths within the design. Three synthesis-driven implementations with S-boxes at different
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locations for each are combined with three circuit-driven implementations to obtain
twelve static versions of the AES engine. Correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks are
applied to a trace set composed of measurements from all twelve AES versions. The
scheme improved resistance to CPA by more than two orders of magnitude over
unprotected AES. Leakage present in the circuit-directed variants suggest that this
method alone would not provide sufficient protection against power analysis attacks.
However, the fully synthesis-directed approach is limited to only three versions.
Hettwer et al. use a similar synthesis-directed technique for generating diversity
[49]. For each variant, 80% of the slices for the defined reconfigurable area are prohibited
for placement until after the other 20% has been placed. This method is used to create
128 versions of the AES engine that are randomly selected for configuration. The
placement and route (P&R) restrictions for the bitstream generation enabled a spatially
randomized design that is effective against localized EMA and fault injection. However,
resistance to CPA is only improved by a factor of 2-3, requiring additional
countermeasures to sufficiently prevent such attacks.
The lack of power resistance of the approach in [49] may be attributed to the
method of variant generation. By only implementing P&R specifications, it is likely that
there is minimal diversity within the bitstreams in terms of gate composition. A lack of
diversity in this context would result in similar power profiles between the
implementations even though they are mapped throughout the FPGA fabric. Therefore,
extraction of the key is still possible when an attack is performed using the power sidechannel rather than localized EM. The SPREAD approach [88] was able to achieve a
much higher level of resistance with significantly fewer versions of AES. This may be
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attributed to the gate-level adaptations provided by the synthesis- and circuit-driven
techniques used. It is possible that the countermeasure presented in [49] could be
improved using different circuit variant generation schemes (e.g., those used in [88]), but
diversity would be limited by the size of the circuit since the entire AES core is replaced.

2.6 Moving Target Defense
Cyber defense includes three complimentary categories: proactive, active, and
regenerative [101]. In this cohesive model, proactive measures harden the system to make
it more resilient against attacks, active defenses involve attack detection and real-time
responses, and regenerative techniques are used to restore the system after an attack.
Each of these techniques are reactive in nature, designed to patch known vulnerabilities
of a system or respond to an attack that has been detected [102].
A Moving target defense (MTD) is a more proactive approach. System changes
are made over time to create a varying attack surface [103]. Rather than hardening
specific aspects of a configuration, MTD enables a complex target that makes attacks
more difficult to complete. Modifying characteristics of the system pseudo-randomly
disadvantages the attacker in the reconnaissance phase [104]. The time attackers have to
discover and exploit vulnerabilities is limited in an MTD system. Persistence is also more
difficult for cyber-attacks since any privileges gained may be lost when the system is
altered [105]. MTD techniques may also be used to introduce additional protection to
systems in which other security mechanisms are already implemented [102].
MTDs have been introduced at many different levels to protect a variety of
systems and devices. Address hopping and port hopping may be used to protect networks
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[106]–[108]. Address space layout randomization, data space randomization, and
instruction set randomization are deployed in most current operating systems [109]–
[111]. MTD techniques have also been used to provide low-cost side-channel attack
prevention in several contexts including cloud architectures [112], processor caches
[113], embedded systems [69], [114], among others [115].
Many cryptographic SCA countermeasures have also incorporated MTD methods
through refreshing parameters. Masking schemes, for example, need to implement a
sufficient level of refreshing in order to remain effective [62], [116], [117].
Cryptographic targets may also disrupt SCA by updating the secret key. This concept,
called key refreshing, involves generating new session keys from a nonce and master key
to thwart SCA attacks. The principal behind using re-keying methods is that the burden
of protection is shifted from the cryptoprocess to the easier to secure re-keying algorithm
[118]. The rate of key-refreshing determines the window in which an attack can occur.
While some works propose a new key for each block of plaintext [119], frequent updates
can introduce significant costs to the system since the nonce would need to be
synchronized across all parties [114]. It is also important that the key update function is
secure against SCA to prevent the extraction of the master key [120]. Recent works have
proposed securely rekeying at an interval that is based on the number of required traces to
complete a power analysis or EMA attack [114], [121]. Similar countermeasures
involving register renaming [122], [123] and algorithm-level parameter randomization
[26], [124]–[127] have been proposed which pseudo-randomly alter characteristics about
the system that are leveraged in side-channel attacks.
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Dynamic logic reconfiguration (DLR) has been used to implement FPGAoriented MTDs in which redundant logic blocks are placed throughout the FPGA fabric
and are randomly selected for operation at runtime. This method has been used to hinder
hardware trojans [128], [129] and provide dynamic side-channel countermeasures in
hardware [48], [69].
In their 2019 work, Li et al. [48] propose a DLR-based spatial randomization
technique to minimize leakage that may be exploited through localized EM attacks. In
this MTD countermeasure, a permutation network is used to randomly assign data bytes
to sixteen AES S-boxes and a second permutation network restores the order of the bytes.
By using logic gates rather than look-up tables to synthesize S-boxes, the designer is able
to select the location for each S-box, allowing maximum distance between each
component. Two attack scenarios are simulated: one where the attacker has full access to
the device, enabling a profiling attack, and a second black-box attack. Both attacks
perform correlation analysis using EM traces. When determining the optimal location of
the probe, the profiling attacker observes no distinct hotspots while the black-box
attacker observes one. This hotspot is linked to the state registers’ location which is
unaffected by the spatial randomization in the S-box layer. The countermeasure increases
the number of required attack traces by 150X for the profiled attack and 3.25X for the
black-box attack. Further work is needed to determine if a similar countermeasure can be
applied to reduce the leakage of the state registers. Implementing another countermeasure
in combination with the spatial randomization to further increase the number of attack
traces is another open area of research.
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The dynamic nature of MTDs enables changes in systems that would otherwise be
static. However, there exists a family of devices that allow hardware configurations to be
altered and/or placed at runtime. This feature, called dynamic partial reconfiguration,
supports the implementation of more complex MTDs in hardware.

2.6.1 Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration
Some system-on-a-chip (SoC) and field programmable gate-arrays (FPGA) have
the capability to alter portions of their hardware configuration during run-time without
interrupting the rest of the chip [130]. This feature, referred to as dynamic partial
reconfiguration (DPR) and is different from the previously discussed DLR in that DPR
schemes change the placement and routing of functions where DLR functions are static.
DPR can be utilized to implement complex moving target defense techniques in hardware
designs.
In [66], Mentens et al. propose the first DPR countermeasure to reduce sidechannel leakage. Their approach introduces temporal jitter by randomly adding registers
between functional blocks to introduce delays. The countermeasure also increases
resistance to fault injection by altering the location of functional blocks which is referred
to as spatial jitter.
Stöttinger et al. [131] propose a SPA and DPA countermeasure for elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) that combines the techniques presented in [66] and by Benini et al.
in [88]. This countermeasure introduced temporal jitter as well as parallel modules that
can be dynamically reconfigured with implementation variants. In a later work, Stöttinger
et al. [100] adapted the DPA countermeasure presented in [99] for reconfigurable

31

platforms. After each encryption, the AES countermeasure uses DPR to reconfigure one
of the two S-boxes in the FPGA fabric with a new implementation. Each implementation
is functionally the same but have different side-channel behavior, reducing the correlation
between real and estimated power consumption values.
Similar to the work presented in [48], Bloom et al. [132] propose a scheme in
which spatial randomization is used to protect a device. This countermeasure, however,
uses DPR rather than DLR to change the location of IP blocks to prevent design- and
fabrication-time trojans from attacking fixed structures in the FPGA. Their hardware
abstraction layer decrypts bitstreams for new IP cores, finds an unused random location,
completes place and route for the core, and deletes the previous one.
Hettwer et al. [49] propose a countermeasure against physical attacks in which the
entire AES core is replaced with a circuit variant implementation over time. Though
power SCA resistance was only increased by at most a factor of 3, the random changes to
the physical layout of the configurations made this countermeasure especially effective
against localized EMA and fault injection. Localized EMA was performed at 135
locations across the chip. The highest correlation value obtained using 5000 traces was
0.1 for the reference implementation and 0.06 for the countermeasure. The probability of
injecting a fault is also reduced to less than 1% with the countermeasure implemented.
The replacement of the entire AES core results in encryption stalls during reconfiguration
as well as a large storage overhead for the bitstreams.
Huss et al. [133] describe a concept for a mutating runtime architecture which
combines three countermeasures for AES. Recent work [88] presents a similar approach
for side-channel power resistance for encryption algorithms using DPR called SPREAD.
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This countermeasure utilizes an extra copy of an AES S-box to allow partial bitstream
reprogramming. A customized tool is used to create relocatable bitstreams which will
allow the same bitstream to be programmed at different locations by changing a frame
address. A multiplexing scheme is used to isolate the redundant S-box so that it can be
replaced with a functionally equivalent variant of one of the other sixteen S-box
structures and reincluded in the AES engine. Another S-box is then randomly selected to
be reprogrammed as the process is repeated. The work published in [88] displays a proof
of concept in which 12 versions of an AES engine are tested against DPA and CPA. A
fully operational version is needed to determine the actual number of traces required to
break the implementation. Further research is also needed to determine how susceptible
this countermeasure is to localized EMA.
Besides SCA resistance, an important consideration when designing and selecting
DPR-based countermeasures is their cost. Even though DPR schemes may have less
inactive logic consuming real-estate than DLR schemes, they can still be expensive
which can limit their applicability and usefulness [132]. Storage overhead for
reconfiguration bitstreams can significantly increase the requirements for an
implementation. For example, a partial bitstream for the scheme proposed in [49] has a
size of 616 MB, requiring over 700 MB to store all 128 variants. This requires external
flash to be able to implement the countermeasure as it is designed. The authors also
suggest implementing additional countermeasures to increase power SCA resistance
which would further increase the cost. An alternative is presented in [88] in which only
S-boxes are reconfigured, but further research is needed to determine how much diversity
is sufficient in a fully dynamic scheme. Further, the timing and throughput overhead
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should also be considered in the design process. The setup time for DPR schemes as well
as any function stalls for reconfiguration can make the security-efficiency trade-off less
desirable. When composing a countermeasure involving DPR, minimizing the number of
required bitstreams and reconfiguration frequency may lead to a design that is applicable
to a wider variety of reconfigurable devices.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

Related works have shown that individually, spatial randomization and implementation
diversity may be used to obfuscate optimal EM probe positions and increase resistance to
power analysis attacks, respectively. However, countermeasures that have attempted to
combine these concepts have yet to display resistance to both power analysis and
localized EMA attacks in an efficient manner. A spatially randomized implementation
may hinder an attacker using a high-resolution EM probe, but if the power consumption
behavior does not vary between implementations, an attacker may still perform a sidechannel attack that is not location-dependent (i.e., a power analysis attack). This scenario
is unfavorable since the equipment to perform a power analysis attack is simpler and
more affordable than that of a localized EM attack [30], [47]. Therefore, it is in the
researcher’s best interest to ensure that defenses against localized EM attacks are also
resistant to power attacks.
The goal of this research is to increase the complexity of both power and localized
EM SCA by introducing structural and spatial randomization of the target hardware. We
propose a countermeasure that utilizes randomly located S-box circuit variants in the PL
side of an SOC. The focus of this approach is limiting the presence of EM “hotspots” that
indicate favorable candidates for high-resolution probe placement as discussed in Section
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2.2. One S-box will be selected and used as the output for the encryption run, mimicking
the behavior of a MTD, and increasing the number of traces needed to perform a
localized EMA attack.
Power analysis resistance will be introduced to the design through the variation in
circuit structure and composition of the S-boxes. By diversifying the implementations at
the gate-level, we aim to vary the power behavior observed by the attacker and disrupt
the correlation between the hypothetical and actual power consumption. For this
countermeasure, all circuit variants will be generated using a program encryption toolkit
(PET) that allows for multiple criteria to be set including subcircuit selection and
replacement size, gate type, and fan-in. The influence the variants have on side-channel
behavior will be determined by implementing multiple AES versions, each with a
different S-box variant. EM traces will be collected for each and their behavior
compared.
A practical countermeasure evaluation will be conducted to determine the
implementation’s resistance to power and localize EM analysis. Power and EM traces
will be collected for both a control and countermeasure implementation. Usable trace sets
will be determined by the inclusion of AES artifacts such as repeated round structures
visible within the traces. DPA and DEMA attacks will be performed on the usable trace
sets using first order analysis. The number of traces needed to obtain sufficient
confidence values of key candidates to differentiate between correct and incorrect bytes
will be used to quantify the success of the attacks. During the acquisition step of the
DEMA attacks, the optimal probe placement will be determined as well as any leakage
hotspots identified. These characteristics will be used to investigate the level of hotspot
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obfuscation provided by the countermeasure. The objectives of this research are shown in
Table 2.

Table 2. Research Objectives for Circuit Variant Moving Target Defense
Objectives

Description

1.

Circuit Variant Side-Channel Behavior Study.

1.1

Generate S-box circuit variants.

1.2

Design control AES implementation.

1.3

Collect EM traces for each AES-S-Box version.

2.

Investigate EM Hotspots.

2.1

Modify AES core to accommodate multiple S-box instances.

2.2

Randomly place S-box P-blocks in programmable logic.

2.3

Collect EM spectralintensity graphs of both implementations.

3.

Assess Trace Sets for Usability.

3.1
3.2
4.
4.1
4.2

Identify AES artifacts within the trace sets.
Determine the target window for first order analysis.
Differential First Order Analysis Attacks.
Improve SNR of collected trace sets.
Evaluate attack success using confidence values for key candidates.

This research differs from related works in both the circuit variant generation
specifications and the increased resistance to localized EM attacks. By limiting the design
to only altering S-boxes, we expect to reduce the storage overhead of the scheme
proposed in [49]. Another distinction from [49] is the criteria for generating variants
which will focus on gate-level diversity and circuit size. This is expected to further
increase resistance to power attacks. This design aims to implement a DLR scheme where
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the SPREAD scheme in [88] utilizes a custom synthesis tool flow to create relocatable
bitstreams. Though this may result in less resource usage for an active implementation in
SPREAD, the reconfiguration logic may introduce noise in the side-channel. The lack of
a reconfiguration controller in the proposed DLR design leaves more area in the PL for Sbox variants. This research will also only utilize a synthesis-driven circuit variant
generation method as opposed to SPREAD which also includes additional hardware for a
circuit-driven approach. To introduce gate-level diversity, we will use a program
encryption toolkit [134] to generate equivalent circuits that vary in size and composition
where the method in [88] exclude specific gate types when generating netlists for each
version. Lastly, the proposed countermeasure will be not only be assessed for power
analysis resistance but for localized EM analysis resistance as well.
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CHAPTER IV
S-BOX CIRCUIT VARIANTS

This chapter details the generation of AES S-box circuit variants (CVs) using a Program
Encryption Toolkit (PET). In particular, the Iterative Selection/Replacement feature of
PET is described. The influence the CVs have on side-channel properties for an AES
implementation are also studied.

4.1 Program Encryption Toolkit
PET is a customized Java application that includes features to generate random
equivalent circuits based on an ICAS BENCH format netlist [134], [135]. The netlist
used as the reference circuit for our S-box consisted of a gate-level implementation that
follows the behavior of the standard AES SubBytes function shown in Table 1. PET’s
Iterative Selection/Replacement (ISR) feature was used to diversify subcircuits within the
S-box structure. In this method of variant generation, shown in Figure 8, a user specifies
a size range for randomly selected subcircuits and a number of iterations for the process
[136]. For each iteration, a subcircuit is selected and replaced by a randomly generated
equivalent circuit. Characteristics of the random circuit may be set by the user including
number of gates, max fan-in, as well as gate types. The circuit variants used in this
research were generated using replacements with a max fan-in of two, selection size of
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two, replacement size of six, and only excluded BUFFER gates. In addition to the
original, five variants were used in the study that were generated using 100 iteration
intervals ranging from 100 to 500 ISR iterations.

Figure 8. Iterative Selection/Replacement

The total number of gates for each S-box variant are shown in Table 3. Because
the configuration for the ISR was to replace two-gate subcircuits with six-gate variants,
the increase between each S-box version was expected to be at least 400 gates. However,
the results shown in Table 3 reveal the gate increases to be well over that estimate. This is
due to PET’s Merged Signature circuit generation method, an example of which is shown
in Figure 9. In the Merged Signature method, a circuit is generated for each function of
the selected subcircuit and then merged to form a single circuit. If the selected subcircuit
is composed of two functions, each of those may be replaced in one iteration. This
accounts for the increase in gates for each S-Box being much greater than 400.
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Table 3. Number of Gates for S-Box Circuit Variants
Iteration
Original
100
200
300
400
500

S-Box
S0
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5

Number of Gates
1136
1914
2696
3473
4248
5025

Figure 9. Merged Signature Circuit Generation. 5 Gates with a Max Fan In of 2.

4.2 Side-Channel Properties
Using PET, a VHDL source for each S-box variant was generated. Each of these
VHDL S-boxes were used in their own AES core that was designed using Xilinx Vivado
Design Suite 2018.1. By default, Vivado works to optimize designs for timing, power
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consumption, and logic resources during synthesis and implementation [137], [138].
Therefore, these setting must be overwritten or bypassed to prevent Vivado from
removing redundant logic that may have been added by PET. Custom synthesis strategies
and implementation settings may be created, but logic optimization may still be
automatically applied, potentially eliminating the intended effects. The best way to
prevent logic from being removed is to add a DONT_TOUCH attribute to items that
should not be modified. Because there is not enough available logic on the SOC to set
each wire within the S-box source as DONT_TOUCH, the entire entity was specified as
such instead as shown in Figure 10. This still allows Vivado to implement the designs as
lookup tables (LUTs) on the device. However, the resulting Boolean logic for the LUTs
vary between S-box designs. An example is given in
Table 5. Power consumption estimates were also provided by Vivado in the implemented
design. The largest difference in dynamic power consumption was 1 mW. This could be
due to the designs being implemented as LUTs rather than the large PET-generated
circuits.
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Figure 10. DONT_TOUCH Logic For S-box 1.

Once placed on the SOC, the execution time for each S-box version was
measured. This was done using the trigger signal of the design which is high during the
AES encryption. The measurements may be found in Table 4 The differences are on the
order of 10 µs but may still be observed in the EM trace. The EM traces for S-box 0 and
S-box 5 may be found in Figure 11 and Figure 12, respectively.

Table 4. Execution Times for AES S-box Variants.
S-Box Execution Time (ms)
1.579
S0
S1
1.560
S2
1.616
S3
1.631
S4
1.631
S5
1.658

Figure 11. EM Trace of S-box 0.
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Figure 12. EM Trace of S-box 5.
Table 5. LUT Equations for S-boxes 1 and 5.
LUT

S-Box 1 Equation

out1206_INST_0_i_3
(LUT6)

O=I0 & !I1 & I3 & !I4 & I5 +
!I0 & !I2 & I3 & I4 & I5 + !I0
& I1 & I3 + !I1 & I2 & !I4 + I0
& !I3 & I4 & I5 + I1 & !I2 &
!I3 & I5 + I0 & !I1 & I2 & I3 +
I1 & !I2 & I3 & !I5 + I2 & !I3
& !I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I1 & !I3 &
!I4 + I0 & !I1 & !I2 & I4 & !I5
+ !I0 & !I2 & !I3 & I4 & !I5 +
I0 & I2 & I3 & !I4 & I5 + I1 &
I2 & !I3 & I4 & I5 + I0 & I1 &
!I3 & !I4 & !I5

out1206_INST_0_i_4
(LUT6)

O=I0 & !I1 & I2 & !I3 & !I4 &
!I5 + !I0 & I1 & I2 & !I4 + !I2
& I3 & !I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I2 &
!I3 & I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I1 & I2
& I3 + I0 & I1 & I2 & I4 & !I5
+ !I0 & !I3 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & I1
& !I2 & I3 & I4 & I5 + I1 & I2
& !I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1 & I3 &
!I4 & I5 + I0 & I1 & I2 & !I3 &
I4 + I0 & I1 & !I3 & I4 & !I5 +
!I1 & I2 & I3 & I5 + !I0 & !I1
& I2 & I5 + !I0 & I1 & I2 & I3
& I5

out1206_INST_0_i_5
(LUT6)

O=I0 & I1 & !I4 & !I5 + !I0 &
!I1 & I2 & !I3 & !I4 + !I0 & I1
& I2 & I4 & I5 + I0 & I1 & I3
& I4 + !I0 & I1 & I3 & !I4 + I0
& !I1 & I2 & I3 & !I4 + I0 &
!I2 & I3 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & !I2
& !I3 & I4 & I5 + !I0 & !I1 &
I3 & I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1 & !I2 &
I4 & !I5 + !I1 & !I2 & !I3 & !I4
& !I5 + I1 & !I2 & I3 & !I5 +
!I1 & !I2 & !I3 & I4 & I5

out1206_INST_0_i_6
(LUT6)

O=!I0 & I1 & !I2 & !I3 & !I4 &
!I5 + !I0 & !I1 & I2 & !I3 + I0
& I2 & I3 & !I4 & !I5 + I0 &
!I1 & !I2 & I4 & !I5 + I0 & I1
& !I2 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1 &
!I2 & !I3 & I4 + !I0 & I1 & I4
& I5 + !I1 & I2 & I3 & I5 + !I0
& I3 & I5 + I0 & I1 & !I3 & I4
& !I5 + !I0 & I2 & !I3 & I4 +
!I1 & !I2 & !I3 & I4 & !I5
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S-Box 5 Equation
O=I0 & I1 & !I2 & I3 & !I5 +
!I0 & I1 & I2 & I3 & !I4 + !I2
& I3 & I4 + !I0 & !I4 & I5 + I0
& I1 & I2 & !I3 + I1 & !I3 &
I4 & !I5 + !I1 & I3 & I4 & !I5
+ !I0 & !I1 & !I3 & I5 + !I1 &
!I2 & !I3 & !I4 & !I5 + I0 & I2
& I3 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1 &
I2 & !I4 & !I5 + I0 & I1 & !I2
& I4 + I0 & !I2 & I4 & !I5 +
!I0 & !I2 & !I3 & !I4 + !I0 &
I1 & I2 & I3 & I5 + !I0 & I2 &
!I3 & I4 & !I5
O=I0 & !I2 & !I3 & !I5 + !I0 &
I3 & !I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I1 & I2
& !I3 & I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I2 &
!I3 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & I1 & I2
& I3 & !I4 & I5 + !I0 & I1 &
I2 & I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1 & I3 &
I4 + I0 & I1 & I4 & !I5 + I1 &
!I2 & I4 & !I5 + !I1 & !I2 & I3
& I4 + I0 & !I1 & I2 & I3 &
!I5 + I0 & !I1 & !I2 & I4 + I0
& I1 & I2 & !I3 & I4 + I0 & I1
& !I2 & I3 & I4 + !I0 & I1 &
I2 & !I3 & I5
O=!I1 & I2 & !I3 & !I4 & !I5 +
I0 & I1 & I2 & !I3 & I4 + !I0
& !I1 & I3 & I4 + I1 & I3 & I4
& I5 + !I1 & !I3 & I4 & I5 + I0
& I1 & !I2 & I3 & !I5 + I0 &
I1 & !I3 & !I4 & I5 + I0 & !I1
& I3 & !I4 & I5 + !I0 & I1 &
!I2 & I3 & !I4 + !I0 & !I1 &
!I2 & !I4 & !I5 + I0 & !I1 &
!I2 & I3 & I5 + !I1 & I2 & I3
& !I4 & I5 + I0 & I1 & !I2 &
!I4 & !I5 + !I0 & !I2 & I4 & I5
O=I1 & I2 & !I3 & !I4 & !I5 +
!I2 & I3 & !I4 & !I5 + !I0 &
!I1 & !I2 & !I3 & I4 & !I5 + I0
& I1 & !I2 & I4 + I0 & !I1 &
I2 & !I3 & I4 + I0 & !I2 & I5 +
!I0 & I1 & I2 & !I3 & !I4 + !I0
& !I1 & I2 & I3 & I5 + !I0 &
I1 & I2 & I4 & !I5 + I0 & I3 &
!I4 & I5 + I1 & !I2 & I3 & !I5
+ !I0 & I1 & !I3 & !I4 & !I5
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CHAPTER V
COUNTERMEASURE DESIGN

In this chapter, details of the circuit-variant moving target countermeasure design are
discussed as well as the control implementation. An overview of the equipment and
resources used in this research is provided.

5.1 Equipment and Resources
This research uses a Digilent ZedBoard evaluation and development platform, which
features a Zynq-7000 SoC XC7Z020-CLG484-1 (Dual ARM Cortex-A9 MPCore
667MHz) complete with 85k programmable logic cells, 4.9Mb BRAM, and 512 MB
DDR3 [139], [140]. Xilinx Vivado Design Suite 2018.1 was used to design and program
the system. With this software, a user may synthesize designs from behavioral
descriptions (e.g., VHDL code), add and configure specialized IP cores, specify
placement and route (P&R) details, simulate execution, and generate then export
bitstreams to the device. The AES core was designed in C using Vivado High Level
Synthesis (HLS). This software allows IP behavior to be written in C, C++, or SystemC
and then synthesized and output as a VHDL or Verilog-based IP source. HLS manages
the incorporation of code needed to allow an IP core to serve as an AXI peripheral in
order to use industry standard embedded communication protocols and interfaces. This is
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useful in that it does not require any interference from the user to modify an IP source to
that it may access Zynq resources (e.g., UART ports). A java-based program encryption
toolkit (PET) was used to generate circuit variants as described in CHAPTER IV.
To collect power and EM traces for the analysis, a Riscure Side-Channel analysis
Suite including an EM Probe station, PicoScope 3000 Series oscilloscope, and Inspector
2021.1 software was used. The probe station consists of a high-resolution EM probe and
a motorized XYZ table which are integrated with the Inspector software for configuration
and measurement. The coil for the EM probe has an inner area of 1 mm2 and outer area of
2 mm2. The station can be setup to automatically scan the surface of the chip with a step
size as small as 2.5 μm. The PicoScope 3206D oscilloscope is a USB-powered, twochannel oscilloscope with 200 MHz analog bandwidth and 1GS/s real-time sampling.
The Inspector software was used to configure the equipment for trace collection, generate
and send random plaintext to the target device, receive ciphertext output, store traces,
perform pre-processing on traces (e.g., filtering and resampling), and statistically analyze
the samples during the attacks. The target algorithm for this research is AES-128 [27].
This limits the algorithm to ten encryption rounds for a 128-bit block of plaintext.

5.2 Countermeasure Design
The AES implementation protected with our countermeasure consists of several
IP blocks that were configured using Vivado. This includes the HLS AES core, Zynq
Processing system, AXI GPIO, as well as AXI interconnecting IP blocks that allow for
communication between the components. The connections between IP blocks are shown
in the Vivado block diagram, Figure 13. The Zynq System on a Chip (SOC) features a
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processing system (PS) and FPGA programmable logic (PL). The Zynq processor serves
as the controller for the implementation, providing the clock and reset signals that control
the other IP blocks in the design. Though the AES implementation is hardware based, the
input and output are also handled by the PS side of the SOC. Interfacing applications are
hosted on the PS side that are used to communicate to the device with the Inspector
software (i.e., send and receive data blocks) as well as control a hardware trigger that
indicates the start of an encryption run. A device block diagram is shown in Figure 14.

Figure 13. IP Core Block Diagram.

During each execution of the algorithm, a 128-bit block of random data is sent
from the Inspector software to be encrypted by the AES scheme. When the data is
received, the hardware trigger is set to high to indicate the process start. The trigger is
measured with an oscilloscope that is connected to the Inspector software so that trace
measurement starts at the correct time.
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Figure 14. System Block Diagram.

The countermeasure proposed in this research aims to improve resistance to sidechannel attacks by spatially and structurally randomizing an implementation of the AES
encryption algorithm. Specifically, the AES S-box is the point at which the
countermeasure is applied since it is of particular interest to SCA attackers. The HLS IP
source for the AES core was modified to incorporate the PET-generated variants into the
design. Typically, S-boxes are implemented as look-up tables in memory. That structure,
however, was replaced by the six S-box variants. A multiplexor was also added to select
which S-box output to use based on an input signal randomly generated by the Zynq
processor.
To prevent Vivado from removing redundant S-boxes, DONT_TOUCH logic was
applied to the VHDL entities as discussed in CHAPTER IV. By default, Vivado also
optimizes designs for timing when performing place and route. To introduce spatial
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randomization to the design, logic for each S-box variant was placed in its own P-block
(i.e., placement constraint block). The remaining AES components were placed together
in another P-block while all other IP blocks were placed in a P-block together. The S-box
P-blocks were then mapped to the PL in a random order and placed for maximum spread
between S-boxes within timing requirements. The other two P-blocks were placed to
meet timing requirements by Vivado. The resulting countermeasure device layout is
shown in Figure 15. It may be observed that there are 12 S-box instances rather than the
six versions that were generated. This is due to the behavior of the HLS AES core which
introduces some unrolling of the algorithm which results in two S-box instances. Since
six versions of the S-box were added, the IP core realized an additional copy of each.
Additionally, the lines in the layout between P-block represent shared nets. The red
bundle net between the AES components P-block and the remaining IP P-block indicates
that there are 60-200 shared nets.

Figure 15. Countermeasure Device Layout.
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5.3 Control Implementation
The control implementation utilizes the same HLS AES core as the
countermeasure; however, different modifications were made to the code. Rather than
introducing multiple instances of S-boxes, the memory look-up structure of the original
code was replaced by S-box 0. The source code for S-box 0 is the original circuit that was
used to generate five variants in PET, as discussed in Chapter CHAPTER IV. The
connection of IP cores as shown in Figure 13 remains the same for the control design. For
place and route, the components of the AES core were placed in one P-block while the
remaining components of the design were placed in another. This was done so that the
distance between the AES core and other logic could be maximized to avoid capturing
noise from uninteresting processes during localized EM collection. The device layout of
the control implementation in shown in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Control Device Layout.
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CHAPTER VI
SIDE-CHANNEL RESISTANCE

In this section, the details of performing DEMA and DPA attacks on both the
control and countermeasure implementations are provided. This includes collecting EM
and power side-channel data, identifying usable trace sets, and performing practical
evaluation of both designs using first order differential analysis. Results of these methods
are also discussed.

6.1 Localized EM Analysis
For this attack, a high-resolution EM probe was connected to the PicoScope
oscilloscope to capture measurements during encryption. The coil for the EM probe has
an inner area of 1 mm2 and outer area of 2 mm2. The location of the EM probe was
controlled by an XYZ table that was configured using the Inspector software. The station
can be setup to automatically scan the surface of the chip with a step size as small as 2.5
μm. These devices are represented by the EM probe station in the analysis setup shown in
Figure 17. Before collecting an attack trace set, an optimal probe position must be
determined. This was done by performing trace collection in an XY sweep of the chip at
incremental steps.
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After determining which hotspot most likely corresponded to the target hardware
location, the probe was then placed at those coordinates. A set of 1000 traces each was
collected for the control and countermeasure designs. Traces were collected at 250MHz
which is greater than the recommended sampling rate of twice the frequency of the PL
clock, 100MHz. The number of samples collected for each implementation was selected
so that the execution time was within the length of the trace. For the control
implementation, 500k samples were collected for a 2ms long trace and 700k samples
were collected for the countermeasure design resulting in a 2.8ms long trace. A larger
trace set of 2000 traces was also collected for the countermeasure implementation to use
for the attack.
The Inspector software was then used to reduce noise within the trace set by
filtering out unnecessary harmonics within the signal. Traces were also aligned using the
first round of encryption, which was identified using an autocorrelation of the first trace.
A correlation module was then used to determine the implementations’ susceptibility to
side-channel analysis. Finally, a first order differential analysis was performed on each
implementation. This module provides a list of the best key candidates, their confidence,
and their position. The first order analysis module applied in this research targeted the Sbox output in the first round of AES using a Hamming Weight Model.

6.1.1 Results
The XY scan of the chip resulted in three observable hotspots at different
frequency windows. Hotspots A and B, shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, contain noisy
traces that do not appear to have any artifacts of the AES encryption. However, hotspot C
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shows a relatively lower amplitude pattern in the trace that occurs for the execution time
of the encryption. Figure 20 shows an example from the trace set collected at hotspot C
for the control implementation and Figure 23 shows one from the countermeasure
implementation. The difference in execution time may be observed in each trace where
the low-amplitude pattern occurs for approximately 1.55 ms in the control
implementation and 2.5 ms in the countermeasure implementation. The trace set collected
at hotspot C was selected as the target trace set for the attack since it was the only point at
which artifacts of the encryption could be observed.

Figure 17. Electromagnetic Analysis Setup.

Figure 18. Control Hotspot A and Corresponding EM Trace.
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Figure 19. Control Hotspot B and Corresponding EM Trace.

Figure 20. Control Hotspot C and Corresponding EM Trace.

Each of the observed hotspots occurred at similar coordinates for both the control
and countermeasure implementations. This may be due to the Zynq processor having a
higher influence on the EM field than the AES hardware. Because this is a common
component in the two implementations, it could be responsible for the hotspots occurring
in similar locations. Further, the additional S-box variants of the countermeasure may not
have enough of an influence on the EM field to overcome the hotspots introduced by the
Zynq processor. An attacker may be able to observe artifacts of AES at random locations
on the chip due to the additional S-boxes, however, the XY spectral intensity of the chip
would lead an attacker to collect traces at the same coordinates as the control.
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Figure 21. Countermeasure Hotspot A and Corresponding EM Trace.

Figure 22. Countermeasure Hotspot B and Corresponding EM Trace.

Figure 23. Countermeasure Hotspot C and Corresponding EM Trace.

Though these hotspots occurred at similar coordinates for both designs, the
frequency windows at which hotspot C was varied for each implementation. For the
control, C was observed between 8.789-58.838 MHz while C was observed between
65.674-99.365 MHz for the countermeasure. Though the difference in frequency

56

windows may not influence the side-channel leakage for the designs, it is an observable
difference in behavior between the control and countermeasure implementations. With a
more complex design and/or different analysis method, and attacker may be required to
vary their collection methods for a similar countermeasure due to the observed frequency
window difference.
The first four bits of correlation module output for both implementations are
shown in Figure 24 and Figure 25. With a low-noise trace set, peaks at different times for
various input bits may be observed. These results are used to determine an
implementation’s susceptibility to side-channel analysis and may reveal the point at
which encryption occurs in a trace if it not easily observed. There is too much noise
within the collected trace sets for the correlation module to be of use in an attack.
However, the results do display a difference of bit-level side-channel leakage for the
implementations. With a higher SNR, the correlation module would give better insight to
how the countermeasure influences side-channel leakage as compared to the control.

Figure 24. Control Correlation for Input Bits 0-3.
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Figure 25. Countermeasure Correlation for Input Bits 0-3.

An autocorrelation of a trace from each implementation was performed to
visualize repeating processes. This analysis can be useful to recognize known program
structures, such as S-box substitutions. The resulting graphs showed clear artifacts of the
AES encryption. Figure 26 shows the output for the control implementation in which 18
repeating squares are observed followed by a large bright square at the end of the trace.
This corresponds to the nine iterations of similar rounds in AES possibly followed by the
completion of the algorithm and memory writes of the results. Figure 27 shows the
autocorrelation graph for the countermeasure implementation. A larger repeating square
structure is observed followed by a bright square. The larger size of the repeating
structure is due to the longer execution time of the countermeasure encryption. The
difference in the number of squares in the structure may be due to the multiple S-box
variants present in the design. The position within the traces corresponding to the first
two rounds of AES was identified. The amplitude peak occurring within this window was
used as the reference for static alignment of the trace sets.
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Figure 26. Control Autocorrelation Graph.

Figure 27. Coutnermeasure Autocorrelation Graph.
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The samples present within the window of the first two rounds were used to
perform first order analysis of the control and countermeasure implementations. The
control implementation recovered six nibbles of the key within 291 traces which are
shown in Table 6. Some examples of the confidence values for key candidates are shown
in Figure 28. The entire output of the first order analysis may be found in Appendix A. A
key byte candidate is more likely to be correct if the first ranked candidate has a much
higher confidence than the other ranks. Though only one nibble for the candidates shown
in Figure 28 was correct, the difference between the first and second rank for the key
bytes with one correct nibble are greater than those with no correct bits.
No bytes of the key were able to be recovered from the countermeasure
implementation within 1000 traces. Using a 2000 trace set, two nibbles of the key were
able to be recovered, shown in Table 7. The results for those candidates along with two
incorrect candidates are shown in Figure 29. The entire output of the first order analysis
may be found in Appendix B. For the correct key nibbles, the confidence value difference
between the first and second ranked candidates is less than many of the incorrect key
candidates. Further, the overall confidence of key candidates is very small, less than
0.122 for all bytes. Therefore, the two key nibbles that were correct may have been a
result of coincidence rather than side-channel leakage.
The difference in overall confidence of key candidates between the two
implementations reflects a difference in leverageable side-channel leakage for the
designs. Though the trace set collected from the control implementation was very noisy,
nibbles of the key were still able to be recovered with clear correct key candidates. The
countermeasure implementation significantly reduced the ability to extract clear key
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candidates from first order differential analysis. Even with increasing usable trace set by
nearly a factor of 10, the countermeasure still outperformed the control implementation in
terms of SCA resistance. Though the attack could be improved by further increasing the
number of traces used, it may be more beneficial to reduce the influence of the Zynq
processor on the EM field. Because this component had such a great influence on the EM
side-channel, the effect of S-box circuit variants may also be better observed once the
Zynq processor noise is reduced. Future work is needed to determine what effect this may
have on differential analysis results.

Figure 28. Control First Order Analysis Examples.
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Figure 29. Countermeasure First Order Analysis Examples.

Table 6. Recovered Key from Control Implementation.
AES Key

0xdeadbeefbaadbeeffeedfeedcafebabe

Recovered Key

0x2314be50f6275e5330deec0dd72efa80

Table 7. Recovered Key from Countermeasure Implementation.
AES Key
Recovered Key

0xdeadbeefbaadbeeffeedfeedcafebabe
0xf089fed9dde4e42676491e96f932481c
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6.2 Power Analysis
The ZedBoard used in this research is equipped with a 10 mΩ resistor that is in
series with the power supply. The power consumption was measured across this resistor
using a differential current sense probe and captured using a PicoScope oscilloscope. The
setup for the power trace collection is shown in Figure 30. Similar to the EM collections,
a set of 1000 traces each was collected for the control and countermeasure designs.
Traces were collected at 250MHz for 500k samples and 700k samples for the control and
countermeasure implementations, respectively. Several low frequency components were
present in the trace sets. To reduce the noise introduced by these signals, a XTalClear
Inspector filter was applied which blocks frequencies that do not appear at regular
harmonics intervals. An autocorrelation module was also applied to the trace sets to
identify any repeating processes within the first trace. Due to the noise present in the
power traces, the autocorrelation module did not indicate any artifacts of AES.
Consequentially, no common behavior within the waveforms could be observed and used
for alignment and first order analysis.

Figure 30. Power Analysis Setup.
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6.2.1 Results
An example from the control implementation trace set that was collected across
the current sense resistor is shown in Figure 31. After applying spectral and XTalClear
filters to reduce noise in the traces, no identifiable artifacts of AES were observed as
there were in the EM traces. An example from the resulting trace set is shown in Figure
32. An autocorrelation was still performed on the original and filtered trace sets to
identify any repeating structures of AES that may not be easily observed. The resulting
graphs of each are shown in Figure 33Figure 34. The traces collected from the
countermeasure implementation yielded similar results.

Figure 31. Control Power Trace.

Figure 32. Filtered Control Power Trace.

The absence of AES artifacts could be due to the limitations of power analysis
including being restricted to a single view of the system. When collecting EM traces, it
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was possible to reduce the influence of uninteresting processes and noise by measuring at
a specific location. However, because power measurements are limited to measuring
across the power supply of the entire device, noise from irrelevant components and
processes are included in the trace set. Because the first rounds of AES could not be
identified, first order differential analysis could not be applied to the collected trace sets.
While typically it is possible to improve an attack by obtaining a larger trace set, the SNR
of the target process still needs to be at an exploitable level. It may be necessary to
modify the control and countermeasure designs so that the Zynq processor has minimal
influence on the power consumption or disable the PS entirely. Future work is needed to
determine which design changes would allow a side-channel leakage assessment of both
the control and countermeasure designs.

Figure 33. Control Power Autocorrelation Graph.
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Figure 34. Filtered Control Power Autocorrelation Graph.

6.3 Performance and Cost
The effect the countermeasure had on performance may be observed directly in
the EM traces that were collected. Execution time for both implementations was
measuring using the trigger signal that was output by the device. A GPIO pin was set
high prior to starting the encryption and low once ciphertext was obtained. This signal
indicated an execution time of 1.579 ms for the control implementation and 2.598 ms for
the countermeasure. Though this increase is significant, different circuit variants may
yield different result. Each of the variants used in the countermeasure design increase in
size from S-box 0 to 5; however, a significant size increase may be avoided by adjusting
parameters for generation in PET. While reducing the overall size of circuit replacements
would result in less timing overhead for the countermeasure, it may also result in less
power consumption diversity which is needed to thwart DPA attacks. Future work is
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needed to determine the relationship between circuit variant size and side-channel
leakage.
Table 8. Utilization of Control Implementation.
Site Type
Slice LUTs
LUT as Logic
LUT as Memory
Slice Registers
F7 Muxes
F8 Muxes

Used
1736
1674
62
1845
118
40

Available
53200
53200
17400
106400
26600
13300

Util%
3.26
3.15
0.36
1.73
0.44
0.30

Table 9. Utilization of Countermeasure Implementation.
Site Type
Slice LUTs
LUT as Logic
LUT as Memory
Slice Registers
F7 Muxes
F8 Muxes

Used
2381
2319
62
1849
448
209

Available
53200
53200
17400
106400
26600
13300

Util%
4.48
4.36
0.36
1.74
1.68
1.57

A summary of the utilization statistics is provided in Table 8 for the control
implementation and Table 9 for the countermeasure. For the control implementation,
68.28% of the logic LUTs were utilized by the AES core while 77.12% of the logic LUTs
were used for the countermeasure AES core. Overall, the countermeasure design resulted
in a 37.15% increase in LUTs compared to the control. This may be due to the use of the
DONT_TOUCH attributes in the multiple S-box instances of the countermeasure. This
logic prevented Vivado from removing redundant logic which may have applied to the Sbox variants since they are functionally equivalent. Adding DONT_TOUCH attributes to
other parts of the S-box source code may yield different utilization, performance, and
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side-channel behavior results. However, future research into these effects may be limited
by the available resources on the ZedBoard. For example, DONT_TOUCH attributes
cannot be applied to each of the wires of the S-box circuit variants without exceeding the
number of available slice LUTs. Future work is needed to determine what influence
limiting optimization of other components has on resource usage and side-channel
behavior as well as the integrity of PET-generated variants.

68

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

With the emergence of side-channel attacks, traditional methods of reducing secret key
access may not be sufficient for protecting an encryption scheme. By observing behavior
such as timing, power consumption, and EM radiation, an attacker may be able to
correlate measurements to secret key values. Therefore, it is important to consider
leakage characteristics of designs when working with cryptographic algorithms.
Countermeasures for side-channel analysis may be used to prevent such attacks; however,
it is often necessary to implement combinations of protections to provide sufficient
resistance.
The similarities between power an EM side-channels may allow an attacker who
is in possession of a device the ability to pivot between attacks. Not only can traces for
power and EM be collected with simple measurement setups, but methods for analysis
are also very similar for both. Therefore, not only is it of particular interest to a designer
to combine countermeasures to address the shortcomings of individual protection
methods, but to protect against multiple types of side-channel attacks.
This research proposes a method of circuit-variant moving target defense for
power and EM side-channel attacks. The goal of this countermeasure was to reduce an
attacker’s usable trace set by randomizing the location and circuit structure of the AES S-
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box. The side-channel impact of the proposed design was studied via four research
objectives; 1) Determining if PET-generated circuit variants have an observable influence
on side-channel behavior, 2) Investigating how randomly placed S-box variants are
represented in the EM spectralintensity graph of a SOC, 3) Assessing trace sets for
usability for side-channel analysis, 4) Performing differential first order analysis attacks
on usable trace sets.
The side-channel behavior of the PET-generated variants was studied by
implementing control AES designs each with one version of the S-box circuit. Because
there were not enough LUT slices available on the ZedBoard to set each individual wire
in the S-box source as DONT_TOUCH, only the entity for the source had the attribute
applied. A difference in execution time was visible in the EM trace sets for each of the
variants, increasing as the size of the circuit grew. This result indicated that PETgenerated variants may be used to randomize the power and timing characteristics of a
design. Future work is needed to determine how altering the components excluded from
optimization (i.e., DONT_TOUCH attributes) effects the side-channel behavior. Further,
a variation in timing is not necessarily reflective of the leakage characteristics of the
variants. Future work is needed to determine how PET parameters translate into sidechannel leakage including fan-in sizes, redundancy, and wire lengths.
When comparing the spectralintensity graphs of the control and countermeasure
implementations, hotspots could be observed in similar locations. This may be due to the
common components between the implementations having the most influence on the EM
side-channel (e.g., the Zynq Processor). The hotspot corresponding to the target hardware
was observed within a different frequency window for the countermeasure. This may be a
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result of the multiple S-box circuit variants present in the design, influencing the
frequency contents of the captured signal.
The usability of the collected power and EM trace sets was determined by the
inclusion of AES artifacts such as repeated round structures visible within the traces.
While the EM traces clearly reflected the execution time of the algorithm as well as the
rounds of encryption, no clear AES artifacts could be observed via the power sidechannel. This may be due to the limitations of power measurements including only being
limited to one view of the system. With the EM trace collection, the probe could be
placed over the location that reflected a potentially usable trace set. Contrarily, power
measurements can only be taken across the power or ground supply for the board across
the current sense resistor. This limits the options for noise reduction at the time of
collection since all components on the device contribute to the behavior observed. It is
likely that the inclusion of the Zynq processor was a large contributor to the noise in the
power trace. Future work should focus on improving the SNR of the traces especially the
power signal.
The absence of AES artifacts in the power trace prevented a target window for a
DPA attack to be identified. However, because the rounds of AES could be observed in
the EM signal for both the control and countermeasure implementations, first order
analysis could be applied. Though the entire key could not be recovered from either
implementation, the confidence values for the key candidates revealed a difference in the
strength of the DEMA attacks on the control and countermeasure designs. While clear
correct key candidates could be observed in the control implementation within 291 traces,
the confidence of key candidates was significantly reduced in the countermeasure even
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up to 2000 traces. Further, first ranked values showed little difference in confidence over
lower ranked candidates, indicating that what bits of the key that may be recovered are
not supported with great confidence. This is reflective of a weak attack and supports that
the introduction of randomly located S-boxes in the countermeasure increases the number
of required traces to disclose the secret key.
Another area of future work is to implement a DPR version of the
countermeasure. For this concept, only one S-box variant is connected in the logic at a
time and replaced intermittently using a partial bitstream containing a different version.
The decision to implement a DLR scheme rather than a DPR scheme for this research
was to avoid the potential noise from reconfiguration logic. Additionaly, it is possible
that the reconfiguration logic may be of aid to an attacker in that any observable artifacts
of triggering the PRC would indicate the point at which the device has been changed.
This may prompt the attacker to discard measurements until another trigger is detected or
the triggering artifact may be used by the attacker to parse the trace set for useful
measurements. However, if the functions of the PS used in this research could be
replaced by other logic in a DPR scheme, it may improve the SNR of the side-channel
signals. Further, larger circuit variants may be used since they would not need to share
resources with collocated S-box version. Additional research is needed to determine
which scheme results in a higher SNR as well as what effect larger circuit structures
would have on the overall performance and leakage of the design.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: First Order Analysis of Control Implementation
Results after 291 traces
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 0 with rdm: 0.0670:
rank: 1, candidate: 35 (0x23), confidence: 0.2981 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 68 (0x44), confidence: 0.2966 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 251 (0xFB), confidence: 0.2879 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 235 (0xEB), confidence: 0.2852 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 1 with rdm: 1.9437:
rank: 1, candidate: 20 (0x14), confidence: 0.3463 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 43 (0x2B), confidence: 0.3008 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 225 (0xE1), confidence: 0.2978 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 247 (0xF7), confidence: 0.2957 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 2 with rdm: 0.1265:
rank: 1, candidate: 190 (0xBE), confidence: 0.2940 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 221 (0xDD), confidence: 0.2912 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 114 (0x72), confidence: 0.2908 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 91 (0x5B), confidence: 0.2908 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 3 with rdm: 0.5277:
rank: 1, candidate: 80 (0x50), confidence: 0.3176 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 94 (0x5E), confidence: 0.3060 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 128 (0x80), confidence: 0.2988 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 87 (0x57), confidence: 0.2856 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 0 with rdm: 0.6389:
rank: 1, candidate: 246 (0xF6), confidence: 0.3046 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 127 (0x7F), confidence: 0.2914 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 202 (0xCA), confidence: 0.2857 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 163 (0xA3), confidence: 0.2802 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 1 with rdm: 0.6371:
rank: 1, candidate: 39 (0x27), confidence: 0.3128 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 14 (0x0E), confidence: 0.2987 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 83 (0x53), confidence: 0.2850 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 222 (0xDE), confidence: 0.2837 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 2 with rdm: 0.3041:
rank: 1, candidate: 94 (0x5E), confidence: 0.2934 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 249 (0xF9), confidence: 0.2867 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 209 (0xD1), confidence: 0.2798 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 62 (0x3E), confidence: 0.2795 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 3 with rdm: 0.4298:
rank: 1, candidate: 83 (0x53), confidence: 0.3052 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 56 (0x38), confidence: 0.2955 at position:
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30644
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rank: 3, candidate: 176 (0xB0), confidence: 0.2936 at position: 9926
rank: 4, candidate: 54 (0x36), confidence: 0.2902 at position: 46528
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 0 with rdm: 0.7739:
rank: 1, candidate: 48 (0x30), confidence: 0.3012 at position: 45614
rank: 2, candidate: 132 (0x84), confidence: 0.2840 at position: 19165
rank: 3, candidate: 251 (0xFB), confidence: 0.2840 at position: 18246
rank: 4, candidate: 157 (0x9D), confidence: 0.2837 at position: 46269
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 1 with rdm: 0.2525:
rank: 1, candidate: 222 (0xDE), confidence: 0.3229 at position: 33403
rank: 2, candidate: 175 (0xAF), confidence: 0.3168 at position: 44658
rank: 3, candidate: 196 (0xC4), confidence: 0.2968 at position: 6330
rank: 4, candidate: 20 (0x14), confidence: 0.2872 at position: 29339
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 2 with rdm: 0.2162:
rank: 1, candidate: 236 (0xEC), confidence: 0.3049 at position: 41593
rank: 2, candidate: 233 (0xE9), confidence: 0.3000 at position: 45353
rank: 3, candidate: 173 (0xAD), confidence: 0.2955 at position: 24858
rank: 4, candidate: 207 (0xCF), confidence: 0.2889 at position: 52198
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 3 with rdm: 0.6103:
rank: 1, candidate: 13 (0x0D), confidence: 0.3101 at position: 25167
rank: 2, candidate: 204 (0xCC), confidence: 0.2964 at position: 26499
rank: 3, candidate: 225 (0xE1), confidence: 0.2946 at position: 42044
rank: 4, candidate: 130 (0x82), confidence: 0.2937 at position: 31988
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 0 with rdm: 0.8589:
rank: 1, candidate: 215 (0xD7), confidence: 0.3271 at position: 6947
rank: 2, candidate: 169 (0xA9), confidence: 0.3086 at position: 11477
rank: 3, candidate: 224 (0xE0), confidence: 0.2990 at position: 34315
rank: 4, candidate: 99 (0x63), confidence: 0.2868 at position: 37140
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 1 with rdm: 0.2344:
rank: 1, candidate: 46 (0x2E), confidence: 0.2985 at position: 25770
rank: 2, candidate: 29 (0x1D), confidence: 0.2938 at position: 35983
rank: 3, candidate: 45 (0x2D), confidence: 0.2776 at position: 41323
rank: 4, candidate: 31 (0x1F), confidence: 0.2775 at position: 38632
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 2 with rdm: 0.0231:
rank: 1, candidate: 250 (0xFA), confidence: 0.2970 at position: 50299
rank: 2, candidate: 56 (0x38), confidence: 0.2964 at position: 37791
rank: 3, candidate: 158 (0x9E), confidence: 0.2952 at position: 7780
rank: 4, candidate: 61 (0x3D), confidence: 0.2930 at position: 43594
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 3 with rdm: 0.6883:
rank: 1, candidate: 128 (0x80), confidence: 0.3111 at position: 48872
rank: 2, candidate: 60 (0x3C), confidence: 0.2953 at position: 32478
rank: 3, candidate: 226 (0xE2), confidence: 0.2934 at position: 48927
rank: 4, candidate: 85 (0x55), confidence: 0.2838 at position: 13568
Unverified key:
00100011000101001011111001010000111101100010011101011110010100110011000
011011110111011000000110111010111001011101111101010000000/0 bits
entropy remain (0x2314be50f6275e5330deec0dd72efa80)
Key can not be verified. Setting key to the most likely value
Detailed key info:
00100011000101001011111001010000111101100010011101011110010100110011000
011011110111011000000110111010111001011101111101010000000/0 bits
entropy remain (0x2314be50f6275e5330deec0dd72efa80)
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Appendix B: First Order Analysis of Countermeasure Implementation
Results after 1997 traces
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 0 with rdm: 0.8468:
rank: 1, candidate: 240 (0xF0), confidence: 0.1192 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 168 (0xA8), confidence: 0.1130 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 241 (0xF1), confidence: 0.1100 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 200 (0xC8), confidence: 0.1096 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 1 with rdm: 0.8235:
rank: 1, candidate: 137 (0x89), confidence: 0.1192 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 210 (0xD2), confidence: 0.1134 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 162 (0xA2), confidence: 0.1084 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 37 (0x25), confidence: 0.1059 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 2 with rdm: 0.5825:
rank: 1, candidate: 254 (0xFE), confidence: 0.1075 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 202 (0xCA), confidence: 0.1037 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 220 (0xDC), confidence: 0.1030 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 122 (0x7A), confidence: 0.1029 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 0, Row 3 with rdm: 0.0877:
rank: 1, candidate: 217 (0xD9), confidence: 0.1104 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 51 (0x33), confidence: 0.1098 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 161 (0xA1), confidence: 0.1070 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 198 (0xC6), confidence: 0.1063 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 0 with rdm: 0.8138:
rank: 1, candidate: 221 (0xDD), confidence: 0.1181 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 155 (0x9B), confidence: 0.1123 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 234 (0xEA), confidence: 0.1064 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 63 (0x3F), confidence: 0.1057 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 1 with rdm: 0.5135:
rank: 1, candidate: 228 (0xE4), confidence: 0.1096 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 232 (0xE8), confidence: 0.1061 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 105 (0x69), confidence: 0.1058 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 123 (0x7B), confidence: 0.1045 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 2 with rdm: 0.7374:
rank: 1, candidate: 228 (0xE4), confidence: 0.1147 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 184 (0xB8), confidence: 0.1097 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 30 (0x1E), confidence: 0.1041 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 227 (0xE3), confidence: 0.1039 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 1, Row 3 with rdm: 0.6371:
rank: 1, candidate: 38 (0x26), confidence: 0.1146 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 106 (0x6A), confidence: 0.1102 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 79 (0x4F), confidence: 0.1085 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 154 (0x9A), confidence: 0.1056 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 0 with rdm: 0.3561:
rank: 1, candidate: 118 (0x76), confidence: 0.1118 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 155 (0x9B), confidence: 0.1094 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 146 (0x92), confidence: 0.1078 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 64 (0x40), confidence: 0.1073 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 1 with rdm: 0.3088:
rank: 1, candidate: 73 (0x49), confidence: 0.1149 at position:
rank: 2, candidate: 178 (0xB2), confidence: 0.1126 at position:
rank: 3, candidate: 54 (0x36), confidence: 0.1120 at position:
rank: 4, candidate: 74 (0x4A), confidence: 0.1096 at position:
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 2 with rdm: 0.1465:
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rank: 1, candidate: 30 (0x1E), confidence: 0.1116 at position: 6058
rank: 2, candidate: 204 (0xCC), confidence: 0.1105 at position: 9682
rank: 3, candidate: 91 (0x5B), confidence: 0.1103 at position: 10178
rank: 4, candidate: 166 (0xA6), confidence: 0.1097 at position: 6207
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 2, Row 3 with rdm: 1.3435:
rank: 1, candidate: 150 (0x96), confidence: 0.1192 at position: 5444
rank: 2, candidate: 211 (0xD3), confidence: 0.1100 at position: 3800
rank: 3, candidate: 227 (0xE3), confidence: 0.1056 at position: 4846
rank: 4, candidate: 191 (0xBF), confidence: 0.1035 at position: 5833
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 0 with rdm: 0.1105:
rank: 1, candidate: 249 (0xF9), confidence: 0.1090 at position: 9034
rank: 2, candidate: 88 (0x58), confidence: 0.1082 at position: 7995
rank: 3, candidate: 165 (0xA5), confidence: 0.1060 at position: 4871
rank: 4, candidate: 197 (0xC5), confidence: 0.1048 at position: 8452
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 1 with rdm: 0.5972:
rank: 1, candidate: 50 (0x32), confidence: 0.1125 at position: 5765
rank: 2, candidate: 138 (0x8A), confidence: 0.1087 at position: 10125
rank: 3, candidate: 109 (0x6D), confidence: 0.1075 at position: 3557
rank: 4, candidate: 123 (0x7B), confidence: 0.1050 at position: 9636
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 2 with rdm: 0.3551:
rank: 1, candidate: 72 (0x48), confidence: 0.1132 at position: 3154
rank: 2, candidate: 213 (0xD5), confidence: 0.1107 at position: 3490
rank: 3, candidate: 50 (0x32), confidence: 0.1086 at position: 9217
rank: 4, candidate: 144 (0x90), confidence: 0.1071 at position: 8500
Best score for Round 0: Key: Column 3, Row 3 with rdm: 0.0059:
rank: 1, candidate: 28 (0x1C), confidence: 0.1213 at position: 5891
rank: 2, candidate: 64 (0x40), confidence: 0.1212 at position: 5422
rank: 3, candidate: 70 (0x46), confidence: 0.1121 at position: 3698
rank: 4, candidate: 249 (0xF9), confidence: 0.1095 at position: 10418
Unverified key:
11110000100010011111111011011001110111011110010011100100001001100111011
001001001000111101001011011111001001100100100100000011100/0 bits
entropy remain (0xf089fed9dde4e42676491e96f932481c)
Key can not be verified. Setting key to the most likely value
Detailed key info:
11110000100010011111111011011001110111011110010011100100001001100111011
001001001000111101001011011111001001100100100100000011100/0 bits
entropy remain (0xf089fed9dde4e42676491e96f932481c)
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